讲座题目：The Shapley Value in Positional Queueing Problems

面向对象：全院师生

主讲嘉宾：Youngsub Chun (教授)

       （单位：韩国首尔国立大学）

学科方向：理论经济学

讲座时间：2023年9月22日（周五）下午3：00-5:00

讲座地点：经济学院 402 会议室

摘要：A group of agents are waiting to be served in a facility. Each server in the facility can serve only one agent at a time and agents differ in their cost-types. For this queueing problem, we are interested in finding the order in which to serve agents and the corresponding monetary transfers for the agents. By applying the Shapley value to the problem, we obtain the optimistic and the pessimistic Shapley rules which are extensions of the minimal (Maniquet 2003) and the maximal (Chun 2006) transfer rules of the standard queueing problem. We also present axiomatic characterizations of the two rules. The optimistic Shapley rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with (1) equal treatment of equals and independence of larger cost-types or (2) the identical cost-types lower bound, negative cost-type monotonicity, and last-agent equal responsibility. On the other hand, the pessimistic Shapley rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with (1) equal treatment of equals and independence of smaller cost-types or (2) the identical cost-types lower bound, positive cost-type monotonicity, and first-agent equal responsibility under constant completion time.

嘉宾介绍：Youngsub Chun

Youngsub Chun是首尔国立大学经济系经济学名誉教授，也是经济危机管理研究所所长。他目前担任International Journal of Economic Theory的联合编辑，Social Choice and Welfare，Journal of Public Economic Theory和International Journal of Game Theory的副编辑。Chun教授主要研究合作博弈理论，重点研究当各参与方存在利益冲突时，如何公平分配。他杰出的研究成果刊登于理论领域的一流期刊：Econometrica，Journal of Economic Theory，Games and Economic Behavior，Economic Theory，以及Journal of Health Economics，Energy Economics等应用领域的一流期刊。他于2021年当选为The Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET)的理论研究会员。