讲座题目： Persuasion and Overselling with Two-sided Asymmetric Information

主讲嘉宾：郑捷 教授 （山东大学经济研究院）

讲座时间：2023年4月21日（周五）上午10：00--12：00

讲座地点：华中科技大学经济学院521室

摘要：In markets, sellers tend to oversell, by exaggerating the quality of their goods. We study an information design problem between a seller and a buyer with two-sided asymmetric information. The buyer knows her valuation for the good and the seller can assess its quality. We show that the model rationalizes overselling, even when the buyer is a rational Bayesian. Moreover, overselling is robust to whether the buyer can haggle. Compared to full disclosure, overselling is Pareto improving, making both the seller and the buyer strictly better off. A policy implication is that a benevolent central planner should not enforce full disclosure.

讲座嘉宾简介：

郑捷，清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师，山大特聘教授，清华大学经济科学与政策实验室常务副主任。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副编，Research in Economics副编，曾担任多份SSCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，研究主题涵盖机制设计、市场设计、信息设计等经典问题和合作协调、信任互惠、参照依赖等行为问题。主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。